In conflict tasks, congruency effects are modulated by the sequence of preceding trials. This modulation effect has been interpreted as an influence of a proactive mechanism of adaptation to conflict (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999) , but the possible contribution of explicit expectancies to this adaptation effect remains unclear. The present study shows that it is possible to dissociate explicit expectancies from sequential adaptation effects in a Stroop task, in conditions in which feature repetitions are avoided, and in which the response-to-stimulus interval is set to 0 ms. We found a progressive adaptation effect that depends on the congruency of the previous series of trials, rather than exclusively on the preceding trial. This effect is independent from explicit expectancies (Experiment 1), and can even contradict these expectancies when participants are presented with informative patterns favoring either repeating or alternating congruency (Experiments 2a and 2b). The existence of a progressive adaptation effect independent from explicit expectancies and from repetition priming challenges the idea that conflict adaptation acts always on a top-down basis (Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen, & Liefooghe, 2006) , and it rather indicates the existence of automatic sources of sequential adaptation, including the adaptation to the lack of conflict. Implications of these results on current understanding of some empirical phenomena of cognitive control, such as that of proportion of congruency, will be highlighted.
Classic theories of attention and performance traced a neat division between the determinants of information processing and behavior, distinguishing between automatic, unconscious, involuntary, and uncontrollable processes, on the one hand, and attentional, conscious, voluntary, and controlled processes, on the other (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) . According to this neat division of functions, processing was assumed to take place automatically when it dealt with well-practiced and familiar situations, whereas attentional processing would be recruited in conditions requiring people to respond to unfamiliar environments, or to replace default behavior routines with newly learned actions. This relatively brittle and bicameral view of cognition has, over the last decades, become superseded by more hierarchical views of executive control, which still attribute a central role to the prefrontal cortex in initiating and maintaining goal-directed behavior, but which assume the existence of control loops through all levels of processing (e.g., Cohen, Dunbar & McClelland, 1990; Fuster, 2003; Norman & Shallice, 1986) .
Conflict paradigms provide researchers with invaluable tools to analyze how these different levels of control can modulate performance at different stages in the perception-action cycle. In the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) , for instance, participants are asked to ignore the meaning of some words, and to respond to the color of the ink in which they are printed. The interference effect observed when the meaning of these words refers to a color incompatible with the required response suggests that word reading is carried out automatically (see MacLeod, 1991 , for a review). However, it has been found that this allegedly automatic effect can be controlled at different levels. For instance, the introduction of an explicit cue which informs participants about the congruency of the forthcoming stimulus produces a decrease in the effect (Fernandez-Duque and Knight, 2008) . A similar decrease is also observed when there is a large proportion of incongruent trials (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979) , when a specific context (Crump, Gong & Milliken, 2006) , or a single item (Jacoby, Lindsay & Hessels, 2003) , is associated with the appearance of incongruent trials, and even when the preceding trial was incongruent. This latter effect, initially observed by Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1992) in the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) , has been since confirmed in all major conflict paradigms, from the original flanker (e.g., Ullsperger, Bylsma & Botvinick, 2005) to Simon (e.g., Wühr and Ansorge, 2005) and Stroop tasks (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004) .
Online Control of Automatic Processes
The sequential congruency effect (SCE) has been empirically defined after Gratton et al. (1992) , as an interaction between the congruency of previous and current trials, showing that the congruency effect grows larger after a congruent trial than after an incongruent trial. According to the conflict-monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick et al., 1999; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) , this pattern of results arises as the outcome of an online mechanism of control, which monitors the conflict observed in each trial-arguably by activating the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)-and which reacts to that conflict by strengthening the control on the subsequent trial, by means of structures located at the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This model has received empirical support from neuroimaging studies (Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et al., 2000; Kerns, 2006) , but its predictions are roughly analogous to those derived from a repetition expectancy account, first suggested by Gratton and colleagues (1992) . Indeed, Gratton et al. (1992) accounted for their effect by assuming that participants detected the congruency of each trial, and were biased to expect the congruency of the next trial to be the same as that of the previous trial. Even though the model of conflict monitoring describes these adaptation effects in more automatic terms, both accounts are related in that they both assume that the SCE arises from an assessment of the conflict encountered on the current trial, which in turns produces a proactive adaptation for the following trial (Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010) .
The SCE has also been described as an episodic memory phenomenon, produced by the repetition of processes implemented on two consecutive trials. Mayr, Awh, and Laurey (2003) , for instance, argued that repetition priming could account for the SCE, because the exact repetition of a trial plays two contrasting roles in scoring the congruency effects after either a congruent or an incongruent trial. Indeed, both effects are computed as differential scores obtained by subtracting responses to congruent (C) and incongruent (I) trials, either in the context of a previous congruent trial (cI-cC), or in the context of a previous incongruent trial (iI-iC) . If the exact repetition of a trial results in faster responses, then repetitions in a congruent context (cC) would tend to increase the effect of congruency in that context (cI-cC), whereas repetitions in an incongruent context (iI) would result in a comparable decrease of the effect in that context (iI-iC).
In a similar way, Hommel, Proctor, and Vu (2004) offered an event coding account for this effect, suggesting that all features of an event would become temporarily associated within an event file, so that reaction time (RT) would become faster if these features reappear exactly over the next trial, whereas it would become especially slower when a partial repetition of some features of the encoded event are encountered immediately over the next trial. According to this reasoning, given that partial matching would tend to occur specifically over cI and iC transitions, this would tend to make the congruency scores larger after a congruent trial (cI-cC) and shorter after an incongruent trial (iI-iC).
A number of studies have attempted to respond to these episodic accounts of the SCE, by showing that the effect can be obtained in any conflict task, and specifically in the Stroop task, even after removing those trials involving complete repetitions of events (Kerns et al., 2004; Notebaert et al., 2006) . These studies have typically used three colors instead of two, as a way to produce transitions in which the SCE could be assessed independently of repetitions of either the color or the word. In addition, Notebaert et al. (2006) also argued that repetition priming and endogenous control could differ in their temporal courses, with repetition effects starting earlier, whereas control effects would need some additional time to develop (Posner, 1980) . Relying on this assumption, the authors compared two response-to-stimulus intervals (RSI) as a way to distinguish between these two effects. They predicted that the SCE could arise in both temporal conditions if it was mediated by repetition priming, but that conflict adaptation effects could only be observed in the condition with larger RSI. Accordingly, the authors found that the SCE was observed for both temporal conditions when repetitions entered in the analysis, but that it disappeared for the short RSI when repetitions were excluded. Thus, the authors concluded that the SCE has two different sources: a fast, bottom-up process, which would rely on repetition effects, and a slower, top-down process, which would require more time to develop, and could be identified with the control adaptation effects postulated by the conflict monitoring theory.
The results reported by Notebaert et al. (2006) are clear in sustaining that bottom-up priming and top-down adaptation effects could contribute independently to the SCE. However, they still leave at least two open issues which require further research. First, what the authors describe as a top-down adjustment of control resembles more the expectancy-based mechanisms described by Gratton et al. (1992) than the more reflexive-like functions attributed to the ACC by the conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 1999) . However, as pointed out by Egner (2007) , no study to date has systematically assessed the distinction between explicit repetition expectancies and conflict adaptation effects. Egner et al. (2010) have recently demonstrated an indirect way to approach this issue. Their experiments were also focused on the temporal course of the SCE, and they started from the assumption that explicit expectancies could be maintained indefinitely over time, whereas automatic conflict-adaptation effects could likely be more affected by temporal decay. Their results showed that the SCE was relatively short-lived, thus lending support to a reflexivelike version of this effect. However, because this previous evidence is still somewhat indirect, we believe that it was necessary to adopt a more direct strategy to distinguish between overt expectancies and conflict adaptation effects, by measuring participants' expectancies, and comparing conditions in which overt expectancies and conflict adaptation effects might become dissociated.
A second open issue, still requiring further research, is the procedure used by Notebaert et al. (2006) to control for repetition priming. As Puccioni and Vallesi (2011) point out, using three colors simply does not allow researchers to rule out the effects of repetition, because it is impossible to find a transition of two consecutive incongruent trials (iI) in which no color feature is repeated. Although both Kerns et al. (2004) and Notebaert et al. (2006) claimed to have removed partial and complete repetitions, they referred specifically to those trials repeating either the target or the distractor, but not to those transitions in which a previous distractor feature appears latter as the target, or vice versa. If these partial repetitions of the same color feature playing different roles can delay performance, as it is shown, for instance, in the literature on negative priming (Tipper & Cranston, 1985) , then the effects obtained could be accounted in terms of this partial matching. Indeed, Puccioni and Vallesi (2011) found no SCE in the measures of RT when they used a four-choice Stroop task in which color repetitions were precluded. Our study will adopt a similar strategy to avoid repetition effects, but we will extend the analysis of sequential effects over a larger series of consecutive trials.
Dissociating Expectancies From Conflict Adaptation Effects
There have been a few attempts to dissociate expectancies from conflict adaptation effects using degraded inputs (i.e., perceptually masked conflict stimuli) to prevent participants from becoming aware of their conflicting features, and thus from developing expectancies concerning the congruency of the next trial (Ansorge, Fuchs, Khalid & Kunde, 2011; Kunde, 2003; van Gaal, Lamme, & Ridderinkhof, 2010) . These studies, conducted with responsepriming tasks, which are slightly different from the three standard conflict paradigms, have shown that congruency effects can be obtained even in the absence of prime awareness, but that SCE are either absent (Ansorge et al., 2011; Kunde, 2003) or considerably reduced (van Gaal et al., 2010) in these circumstances.
In the present study, we attempted to dissociate expectancies from conflict adaptation effects in a Stroop task in which all features of the stimuli were clearly visible, but in which participants can develop expectancies opposite to those taken to produce SCE. Specifically, we adapted a procedure originally developed by Perruchet (1985) in the context of an eyeblink conditioning procedure, and which was later used by Perruchet, Cleeremans, and Destrebecqz (2006) to dissociate automatic activation from explicit expectancies in a choice RT task. The gist of the procedure is that, in a task with two types of equiprobable trials, repetition of one type of trial tends to produce opposite effects in expectancies and performance. On the one hand, repetition improves responding to the repeated trial. On the other hand, however, continuous repetition also leads participants to expect the appearance of the alternative type of trial, in accordance with a compensation bias known as the "gamblerЈs fallacy" (Jarvik, 1951) . Applied to the SCE, as it is typically observed in a Stroop task, this gambler's fallacy would lead participants' expectancies for an incongruent trial to grow larger after a series of consecutive congruent trials. Thus, if the SCE was driven by such explicit expectancies, one could expect the effect of congruency to decrease after a long series of congruent trials, in accordance to that compensation bias. In contrast, as predicted by the conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001) , if the SCE arises as a result of the amount of conflict accumulated over the last few trials, then a repeated series of congruent trials would tend to minimize the conflict, and therefore to steadily increase congruency effects, regardless of participants' expectancies.
Indeed, the original rendition of the conflict monitoring theory assumed that the amount of control applied on a given trial would depend not only on the congruency of the immediately preceding trial, but rather on a "weighted average of conflict computed over multiple preceding trials" (Botvinick et al., 2001; p.639) . Unfortunately, this specific aspect of the model, which predicts gradual shifts in control depending on the previous history of trials, has not been sufficiently tested in the Stroop task (but see Durston et al., 2003 , for a related test in a flanker task). The present study will also assess this assumption, which plays an important role in the way in which the conflict monitoring model can account for the effect of trial-type frequency (e.g., Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979) , without assuming the existence of an explicit encoding of these frequencies.
The Experiments
Three experiments were designed to dissociate expectancies from conflict adaptation effects. To make sure that the immediate repetition of color features was not an issue in these experiments, we independently came to a solution analogous to that proposed by Puccioni and Vallesi (2011, Experiment 1) , thus arranging a fourchoice Stroop task in which color repetitions were not allowed. To minimize the effects of explicit expectancies over RTs, we used an RSI of 0 ms on regular blocks, thus presenting the next trial right after the response to the current trial. However, in addition to three regular Stroop blocks, we included two additional blocks in which participants' were asked to report on their expectations concerning the congruency of each upcoming trial. Thus, between each pair of trials from these additional blocks, participants were presented with a 6-point Likert scale, and they were told to use the scale to bet 1, 2, or 3 symbolic points on whether they believed that the next trial was going to be a congruent or an incongruent trial. The goal of this wagering task was to assess whether the gambler's fallacy arose over this Stroop task, even when the series was stopped between successive trials to gather this explicit prediction. Congruent and incongruent trials appeared consistently on 50% of the trials over each block. However, we manipulated the conditional probabilities of appearance of a congruent trial after either a congruent or an incongruent trial, so as to affect participants' expectancies between experiments. In Experiment 1 we reproduced the distribution of trials, which could be expected by chance, by controlling the number and the size of the runs of either congruent or incongruent trials which should appear on each block (Nicks, 1959; Perruchet et al., 2006) . In contrast, in Experiments 2a and 2b we manipulated the distributions of these runs, thus favoring either repetitions of the same type of trials (Experiment 2a) or alternations between different types (Experiment 2b). Thus, the percentage of congruent and incongruent trials was kept constant over the whole series of experiments, but the congruency of each trial provided information about the congruency of the following trial, thus arguably affecting participants' expectancies independently of the accumulated conflict.
Experiment 1: Dissociating Expectancies From Conflict
The main goal of this experiment was to confirm whether explicit expectancies could be assessed online by means of a wagering technique superimposed over a subset of the Stroop blocks, and whether this expectancy measure could become dissociated from the conflict adaptation effects which were assessed in regular blocks. To achieve this goal, we designed an experiment composed of five blocks of a four-choice Stroop task. Blocks 1, 3, and 4 were designed as regular Stroop blocks, whereas Blocks 2 and 5 included a supplementary task requiring participants to predict the congruency of the upcoming trial. In these two blocks, in addition to responding to the Stroop task, participants were required to gauge their expectations for the congruency of the following trial before it actually appeared, by wagering 1, 2, or 3 symbolic points on their prediction, depending on whether they were "sure," "fairly sure," or simply "guessing."
Our main hypotheses concerning this experiment were that (a) according to the previous results reported by Notebaert et al. (2006) and Puccioni and Vallesi (2011) , the standard (i.e., firstorder) SCE should not arise in conditions in which immediate repetitions were not allowed, and when the RSI was set to 0 ms. However, if the SCE depends on a weighted average of the conflict observed over the last few trials, as proposed by Botvinick et al. (2001) , then (b) the SCE could be observed even in these conditions, by comparing responses to congruent and incongruent trials after a long series of other previous congruent or incongruent trials. Thus, we expected the effect of congruency to increase after a series of consecutive congruent trials, and to decrease correspondingly after a series of incongruent trials. Finally, if participants' expectancies can be affected by compensation biases such as those illustrated by the gambler's fallacy (Jarvik, 1951) , then (c) the effect of conflict accumulation could become dissociated from reported expectancies. Indeed, participants would tend to predict an incongruent successor after a series of congruent trials, precisely in conditions in which the amount of conflict would reach minimum levels, and when the congruency effects should become maximal, according to the conflict-monitoring theory. Thus, contrary to an expectancy account, we would expect to obtain the largest effects of congruency in conditions in which participants report to be expecting an incongruent successor.
Method
Participants. All the experimental procedures reported in this article were conducted in accordance with the Spanish regulations on behavioral research. Eighteen students of Psychology from the University of Santiago de Compostela (7 men, ages ranged from 18 to 24 years) participated in the experiment, in exchange for a monetary fee.
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiment was designed and controlled using INQUISIT 3.0 software, running on personal computers with 17-in. VGA monitors. Participants viewed the monitor from a distance of approximately 60 cm, and they responded using a standard Spanish QWERTY keyboard placed in front of them, by pressing one of four keys ("z", "x", "n" and "m") which were marked, respectively, with red, blue, yellow, and green stickers.
Procedure. Participants received initial instructions informing them that the task required them to respond to the color of a series of words, by pressing as fast and accurately as possible on the key corresponding to its color. Then, they were presented with a short practice block in which they had a first opportunity to get used to the arbitrary mapping established between colors and keys. Over this practice block, they were presented with words unrelated to colors for 50 trials (we used the Spanish words for house -casa-, plant -planta-, car -coche-, and zone -zona-as the practice stimuli). After that, five experimental blocks including Stroop stimuli were programmed. These trials presented the Spanish words for red (rojo), blue (azul), yellow (amarillo), and green (verde), printed either in a congruent or in an incongruent color. Participants were asked to respond on the color of the ink and to ignore the word meaning. They were also informed that approximately a half of the trials would consist of congruent trials, whereas the other half would correspond to incongruent trials. On each trial, the stimulus remained on the screen until participants pressed the correct key. Errors were indicated by a tone, and participants were urged to press on the correct key for the next trial to appear. The following trial appeared immediately after the correct response, thus resulting in an RSI of 0 ms. At the end of each block, participants were informed about the percentage of correct responses for this block, and they were asked to register this information into a register sheet, as well as to maintain the proportion of incorrect responses below 10%. The measures of expectancies were gathered at the end of the procedure, over the fifth block, but also at a block interspersed among the regular blocks (i.e., the second block). This was intended to confirm that explicit expectancies did not arise exclusively at the end of the procedure, as a reaction to an explicit questioning. The measures of performance on which we inferred congruency and SCEs were taken exclusively from the regular blocks (i.e., Blocks 1, 3, and 4), which included no interruptions between successive trials.
As a way to avoid color repetitions to occur over successive trials, the four colors were arbitrarily grouped into two alternating pairs, so that successive trials never repeated a color code. We grouped together two colors that required responding with different hands (i.e., red with green and blue with yellow), to make sure that alternating between color pairs did not convey information about the specific hand with which the next response should be performed. Thus, over the whole task, the series was a succession of trials showing the word "red" or "green" printed in red or in green, and of trials showing the word "blue" or "yellow" printed in blue or in yellow. Each block contained a series of 176 trials, including exactly 88 congruent trials and 88 incongruent trials.
The runs of trials were arranged to conform to those expected by chance, by following a method described in Perruchet et al. (2006; see Nicks, 1959) . Thus, the whole sequence of 176 trials was decomposed into 32 runs of a single trial (16 congruent and 16 incongruent trials), 32 runs of two consecutive trials (16 congruent pairs and 16 incongruent pairs), 16 runs of three consecutive trials (eight congruent triplets and eight incongruent triplets), and eight runs of four consecutive trials (four congruent quadruplets and four incongruent quadruplets). Table 1 shows this pattern, compared with those arranged in Experiments 2a and 2b. Because series larger than four trials would arise very infrequently, we set length-four as the maximum level of successive trials of the same type. All these runs were randomly ordered for each block and participant, with the constraint that congruent and incongruent runs should alternate with each other, so as to avoid generating larger runs out of the concatenation of shorter series. As a consequence of this design, not only the proportion of congruent and incongruent trials, but also the probabilities of finding repetitions or alternations between congruent and incongruent trials were wellbalanced for each individual block.
As for the blocks containing measures of expectancies, they included the same number and structure of Stroop trials, but they were supplemented with the additional wagering task, which was performed between any two Stroop trials. At the beginning of each block, participants were awarded with 100 symbolic points, and they were asked to wager 3, 2, or 1 of these points depending on the certainty of their prediction as to whether the next trial was going to be a congruent or an incongruent trial. A counter showing the remaining points for that block was visible at the top of the screen, and a 6-point Likert scale was depicted horizontally at the bottom of the screen, showing from left to right the possible bets and their respective verbal labels: congruent (sure ϭ 3, fairly sure ϭ 2, guess ϭ1), and incongruent (guess ϭ 1, fairly sure ϭ 2, sure ϭ 3). Participants responded to this question by using the mouse to press on the point corresponding to their bet. Then, the next trial followed, containing an update of the remaining points, and the next Stroop trial, which served as an indirect feedback on the accuracy of their prediction. Thus, the series of Stroop trials presented over the wagering blocks was analogous to those used over the standard blocks, but the addition of the wagering task altered the temporal parameters of the task, and thus made it advisable not to rely on these blocks to assess the effects of congruency.
Results
For all reported experiments, the alpha level was set at .05. We report on partial eta squared ( p 2 ) as an index of the effect size, and on the Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p values whenever this correction is relevant, although the nominal degrees of freedom are maintained. The effect of congruency across blocks and SCEs were assessed separately from the mean RTs and from the proportion of correct responses registered across Blocks 1, 3, and 4. Subjective expectancies were assessed from participants' responses to the Likert scales over Blocks 2 and 5.
Congruency and sequential congruence effects. As for the measures of RT, we removed the first trial of each block, as well as RT from incorrect responses, and for trials immediately following an error (Notebaert et al., 2006) . RTs for those trials with latencies straying more than 3 standard deviations from the individual mean, computed for each block and participant, were also removed from the analyses. Overall, these criteria led to the exclusion of 5.6% of the trials.
Responses 2 ϭ .26, indicating an advantage for responding to congruent trials over the first block (1.5%), which disappeared later over Blocks 3 and 4 (-0.7 and -0.1%, respectively).
As for the SCE, we conducted this analysis in two alternative ways. First, in compliance with the standard procedure (e.g., Egner, 2007) we compared the effect of congruency depending exclusively on the congruency of the previous trial. We labeled this effect as the first-order SCE. In addition, because we were interested in assessing how this effect grew progressively over a larger sequence of congruent or incongruent trials, we also analyzed the effect that larger runs of congruent or incongruent trials may have on the expression of this congruency effect. We labeled this effect as the progressive SCE.
A repeated-measures ANOVA on RT with Previous Congruency and Congruency as repeated factors showed a strong effect of Congruency, F(1, 17) ϭ 45.73, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .73, but not a significant effect of Previous Congruency, F(1, 17) ϭ 2.44, p ϭ .14, p 2 ϭ .13, nor a significant interaction between them, F(1, 17) ϭ 1.80, p ϭ .20, p 2 ϭ .10. As can be observed in Figure 1a , the effect of congruency amounted to 57 ms after a congruent trial, and it was only slightly reduced to 45 ms after an incongruent trial. This reduction was not enough to sustain a statistically reliable first-order SCE, which was neither obtained in the ANOVA conducted on the error rates, F(1, 17) ϭ 1.77, p ϭ .20, p 2 ϭ .09. The absence of a first-order SCE was consistent with the claim that this effect should not arise with very short RSIs (Notebaert et al., 2006) . However, if the effect of conflict accumulates progressively over trials, then it could be detected as an effect arising progressively with larger runs of congruent or incongruent trials. To assess this prediction, we analyzed the effect of congruency in terms of the type and length of these repetition contexts, distinguishing six contexts respectively made of one, two, or three previous congruent or incongruent trials. Note. The table includes the distribution of the number of runs of either congruent or incongruent trials of each length (one, two, three, or four trials), the type of transition stipulated between successive runs (change or random), the number of congruent and incongruent trials per block, the total number of trials per block, and the overall probability of each type of congruency transition (repetitions vs. alternations) resulting from this structure.
An ANOVA conducted on RT with Context (6) and Congruency of the current trial as repeated factors, showed a main effect of Congruency, F(1, 17) was ordered according to the criterion of amount of conflict (i.e., runs of three, two, and one congruent trials, followed by runs of one, two, and three incongruent trials), this interaction showed a significant linear trend, F(1, 17) ϭ 6.39, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .27, suggesting that the congruency effect increased linearly with the decrease of conflict, thus growing progressively with the number of previous congruent trials, and decreasing with the number of previous incongruent trials (see Figure 1b) . Individual t tests (Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons, ␣ ϭ .0083) showed that the congruency effect was significant after one, t(17) ϭ 5.37, p Ͻ .0001, two, t(17) ϭ 4.76, p Ͻ .0001, and three congruent trials, t(17) ϭ 3.89, p Ͻ .001, as well as after a single incongruent trial, t(17) ϭ 4.16, p Ͻ 001, but that the advantage for responding to congruent trials disappeared after two, t(17) ϭ 2.50, p ϭ .023, or three consecutive incongruent trials, t(17) ϭ 1.26, p ϭ .225. The corresponding analysis on the proportion of correct responses failed to show a significant Congruency ϫ Context interaction, F(5, 85) ϭ 1.41, p ϭ .24, 2 ϭ .08. However, it is important to note that the accuracy for any type of trial tended to increase in the context of the same type of trials, thus ruling out the possibility that the effects observed in RTs could be due to a trade-off between speed and accuracy (Egner, 2007) .
Dissociation between expectancies and sequential congruence effect. To explore whether repetition expectancies could account for the observed SCE, participants' expectancies were assessed from their average bets on Blocks 2 and 5. We recoded these values as expectancies for a congruent trial, so that betting 1, 2, and 3 points for a congruent trial were left unchanged, whereas betting 1, 2, or 3 points for an incongruent trial were rescored as -1, -2, and -3 points, respectively. A preliminary ANOVA comparing the two expectancy blocks showed a nonsignificant Block ϫ Context interaction, F(5, 85) ϭ 2.23, p ϭ .12, p 2 ϭ .12. Therefore, we collapsed both blocks into a single measure. An ANOVA on the expectancy scores with Context as a repeated factor showed that these scores were significantly affected by the preceding context, F(5, 85) ϭ 6.44, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .28 (see Figure  2) . As predicted by a repetition expectancy account, the expectancy for a congruent trial grew larger after a single congruent trial than after a single incongruent trial, t(17) ϭ 3.71, p Ͻ .01. However, after two or three consecutive trials of the same type, participants appeared to fall into the gambler's fallacy, thus tending to expect an alternation pattern. Specifically, after a series of three congruent trials, participants' expectancies for a congruent successor were significantly lower than after an analogous series of three incongruent trials, t(17) ϭ -2.92, p Ͻ .01.
The compensation bias arising in the expectancy scores stood in stark contrast with the results obtained in the measures of RT over the regular blocks. As reported in the previous section, these results indicated that the largest effect of congruency (86 ms) was obtained after three consecutive congruent trials, precisely in the condition in which participants reported their lowest expectancies for a congruent successor. Figure 2 illustrates the dissociation between expectancies and congruency effects more generally, by showing that the effects of congruency tend to decrease progressively with the increase of accumulated conflict, whereas participants' expectancies showed a more complex pattern, which tends to compensate for repetition and alternation transitions, by favoring repetitions after an alternation pattern (i.e., after a single trial of each type), and favoring alternations after a series of repetition trials.
Discussion
In this experiment we have adapted a procedure first devised by Perruchet et al. (2006) to dissociate explicit expectancies from automatic effects in simple RT tasks. We used this procedure in the context of a Stroop task to assess whether the SCE could be attributed to repetition expectancies, or may result from some more automatic processes of adaptation to conflict. Overall, the results clearly favored the latter account, as they showed a dissociation between the effects of congruency obtained after a series of trials of the same type, and the explicit expectancies reported in those contexts. Specifically, we found that the largest congruency effect was obtained after a long series of congruent trials, arguably when the accumulated conflict reached its minimum level, but when participants declared to be expecting an incongruent successor. In contrast, after a repeated series of incongruent trials, the effect of congruency was reduced as predicted by an increase in conflict, despite the fact that participants claimed to be expecting a congruent successor.
It is important to note that the observed dissociation was obtained because our procedure allowed for the assessment of progressive SCE, and that it would have not arisen had we relied exclusively on first-order SCE. Indeed, after a single trial of either type, participants' expectancies and adaptation effects grew in the same direction, increasing the prediction for a congruent successor together with a decrease in conflict adaptation. It was only after a longer run of trials of the same type, arguably when the gambler's fallacy started to play a role, that participants' expectancies changed in a direction opposite to the amount of conflict, thus allowing for the distinction between the effects of these two factors.
The results obtained in this experiment call attention on the assumption, anticipated by the model of conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2001) , that the control exerted on a given trial does not depend exclusively on the amount of conflict observed on the preceding trial, but rather on an average of the conflict experimented over a larger series of previous trials. A similar result was found by Durston et al. (2003) , in one of the few previous attempts to address the impact of larger contexts on the effect of congruency produced in a flanker task. In this behavioral and neurophysiological study, the authors reported an increase in activation over the anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal areas for incompatible trials when the number of preceding compatible trials increased, and a corresponding decrease in the activation of these areas in response to repeated incompatible trials, as the number of preceding incompatible trials increased. No study to date has assessed this neurophysiological pattern in a Stroop task, but our behavioral results, together with the observed dissociation between expectancies and congruency effects, makes the undertaking of this analysis in the future particularly important.
The results of this experiment are thus clear in showing that the SCE cannot be explained solely in terms of explicit expectancies. However, these do not rule out the possibility that such expectancies could be playing a role in the observed SCE, above and beyond that played by conflict adaptation. Although using an RSI of 0 ms could minimize the effect of the expectancies generated by the trial immediately preceding it (Notebaert et al., 2006) , it is still possible that participants may have developed longer-range expectancies over a series of previous trials, which could end up modulating the effects of control over successive trials. To further assess this possibility, and to also confirm that our wagering techniques were able to capture any relevant change produced in participants' expectancies, we designed two follow-up experiments aiming at manipulating these overall expectancies, by including informative contingencies between successive trials. 
Experiments 2a and 2b: Manipulating Expectancies
To further explore the effect of repetition expectancies on the SCE, we replicated Experiment 1 while varying the conditional probabilities of alternations and repetitions of either congruent or incongruent trials (Hyman, 1953; Bertelson, 1961) . We thus maintained the overall proportion of congruence at .50, but varied the first-order conditional probabilities in two different ways. In Experiment 2a, we grouped congruent and incongruent trials into consistent runs, so that the probability of a congruent trial to follow another congruent trial was higher than its probability to appear after an incongruent trial (.70/.30). In Experiment 2b, we made a complementary manipulation, by increasing the probability that alternations between both types of trials are presented, so that the probability of a congruent trial was smaller after another congruent trial (.30) than after an incongruent trial (.70). We expected these contingencies to affect participants' expectancies, and we assessed whether these changes in expectancies affected the SCE independently of the amount of conflict.
Experiment 2a: Repetition Expectancies

Method.
Participants. Another group of 18 Psychology students from the University of Santiago de Compostela (4 men, between the ages of 18 and 27) participated in this experiment, in exchange for a monetary fee.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that described for Experiment 1, with the exception that the runs described for Experiment 1 were slightly modified to allow for a larger proportion of repetitions. Each block was still composed of 176 trials, made up of 64 single-trial runs, 32 runs of two trials, and 16 runs of three trials. As in Experiment 1, half of these runs was made of congruent trials, whereas the other half was made of incongruent trials. At variance with Experiment 1, however, the number of four-trial runs was not fixed by the design. Instead, we removed the constraint that transitions between successive runs must alternate between congruent and incongruent runs, so that it became possible to generate longer runs of trials out of the concatenation of shorter ones. Because the proportion of congruent and incongruent runs was still balanced, but the transitions between them were now randomly generated, the overall design biased the distribution of transitions toward the repetition of the same congruency class. Specifically, this manipulation increased the conditional probability of producing repetitions of the same congruency type to .70 (see Table 1 ). It must be made clear, however, that "repetition" here does not refer to a repeated presentation of the same trial (which was forbidden to avoid repetition priming), but rather to the appearance of several congruent or incongruent trials in a row. Results. As in Experiment 1, we excluded RTs for errors, as well as for trials immediately following an error. The first trial of each block and all trials departing more than three standard deviations beyond the mean computed for each participant and block were also removed from the analyses. Overall, the application of these exclusion criteria resulted in the removal of 4.86% of the raw data. Furthermore, to be able to compare the congruency effects under conditions of conflict analogous to those considered in the rest of the experiments, we restricted the analyses to contexts of three or less consecutive trials of the same type. Thus, the larger proportion of repetitions and the larger runs included in this experiment could affect participants' expectancies, but we measured their effects exclusively over contexts comparable with those arranged in Experiment 1. This led us to remove 25.76% of the trials presented in the context of larger runs. Figure 3a ). An analogous ANOVA conducted on the proportion of correct responses showed a significant effect of congruency, F(1, 17) This interaction appeared to stem from the fact that the Congruency effect increased progressively with the number of successive congruent trials, and it tended to decrease with the number of successive incongruent trials, (see Figure 3b) . Accordingly, this interaction showed a significant linear trend when the Context factor was ordered according to the criterion of amount of conflict, F(1, 17) ϭ 8.23, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .33, but it also showed significant quadratic, F(1, 17) ϭ 7.18, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .30, and fifth-order trends, F(1, 17) ϭ 5.77, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .25, which are more difficult to interpret. Individual t tests (Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons, ␣ ϭ .0083) showed that the effects of congruency were significant after two, t(17) ϭ 7.55, p Ͻ .0001, and three congruent trials, t(17) ϭ 4.02, p Ͻ .001, as well as after one, t(17) ϭ 4.59, p Ͻ 0001, or three incongruent trials, t(17) ϭ 3.11, p Ͻ 006. In contrast, the effect was not significant after a single congruent trial t (17) 1 The procedure allowed some variation between blocks and participants in this probability of repetitions, depending on the particular concatenation of runs produced in each block. The actual probabilities experienced by different participants ranged from .67 to .73, with an average of .699. expectancies in accordance with the manipulated contingencies, F(5, 85) ϭ 203.48, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .92. As can be seen in Figure 4a , participants in this experiment did not appear to rely on the gamblers' fallacy, at least over the length of the contexts covered by our analysis (i.e., up to three previous trials). Rather, participants appeared to have learned that repetitions were more likely than alternations, and therefore they kept expecting repetitions of the same type of trial after both congruent and incongruent trials. This result allowed us to conclude that the manipulation of contingencies had been successful to alter participants' expectancies, and that these expectancies could be reliably measured through the wagering task. We will go back to the discussion of these results after describing Experiment 2b.
Experiment 2B: Alternation Expectancies
Method.
Participants. An independent group of 18 students of Psychology from the University of Santiago de Compostela (2 men, ages ranged from 19 to 25) participated in this experiment, in exchange for a monetary fee.
Procedure. The procedure was analogous to that described for the previous experiments, with the exception of those changes directed to increase the probability of alternations between types of trials. To obtain roughly 70% of alternations between congruent and incongruent trials, we reduced the number of larger runs presented on each block, while increasing the number of single, alternating trials. Specifically, each block was composed of 72 single-trial series, 16 two-trial series, 8 three-trial series, and 4 series of four trials (see Table 1 ). As in previous experiments, half of these runs were made of congruent trials and the other half contained incongruent trials. As in Experiment 1, transitions between runs were forced to alternate between congruency types, to avoid producing larger runs out of the concatenation of shorter ones. This amounted to a total of 144 trials per block, from which only 44 transitions (i.e., roughly 30% of them) were congruency repetitions, whereas the rest of them were alternations between congruent and incongruent trials.
Results. Removal of errors, of trials immediately following an error, of the first trial of each block, and of trials falling beyond three standard deviations from individual means, produced the removal of a total of 7.81% of the raw data.
Congruency and sequential congruence effects. interaction between Block and Congruency, F(2, 34) ϭ 2.27, p ϭ .29, p 2 ϭ .07. Responding to congruent trials produced also a numerically larger proportion of correct responses than did responding to incongruent trials (.97 vs. .96), but this difference did not reach a significant level, F(1, 17) ϭ 3.96, p ϭ .06, p 2 ϭ 19. As for the first-order SCE, a repeated-measures ANOVA on RT, with Congruency and Previous Congruency as two independent factors, confirmed the existence of significant effects of Congruency, F(1, 17) ϭ 73.12, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .81, and of Previous Congruency, F(1, 17) ϭ 34.07, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .67, but not an interaction between them, F Ͻ 1 (Figure 3c) . A similar ANOVA conducted on the percentage of correct responses showed a nonsignificant trend to respond more accurately to congruent trials, F(1, 17) ϭ 4.04, p ϭ .06, p 2 ϭ 19, but not an interaction between current and previous congruency effects (F Ͻ 1) .
The progressive SCE was tested through an ANOVA on RTs, with Context and Congruency as independent factors. Results showed a significant effect of Congruency, F(1, 17) ϭ 54.73, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .76. Despite a visible tendency for the effects of Congruency to differ in terms of the specific context in which they were assessed (Figure 3d) , neither the main effect of Context, F(5, 85) ϭ 1.77, p ϭ .16, p 2 ϭ .09, nor the Congruency ϫ Context interaction, F(5, 85) ϭ 2.13, p ϭ .12, p 2 ϭ .11, reached statistical significance.
2 For illustration purposes, however, we conducted individual t tests (Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons, ␣ ϭ .0083) to assess the effect of congruency in each context. 2 The failure to obtain a significant Congruency ϫ Context interaction in this experiment may be due to the statistical constraints incorporated in this design. Because a repetition of the same type of trial can only scarcely occur in Experiment 2b, the number of cases included in these longer repetition contexts is necessarily low. This reduced number of cases entails larger error variances over these extreme contexts (see Figure 3d) , thus unavoidably decreasing the design's power to obtain evidence for effects comparable to those observed in Experiment 2a. These tests showed that the effect of congruency was significant after three, t(17) ϭ 3.39, p ϭ .003, two, t(17) ϭ 3.57, p ϭ .002, and one congruent trials, t(17) ϭ 3.71, p ϭ .002, as well as after a single incongruent trial, t(17) ϭ 6.58, p Ͻ .0001, but that it was lost after two, t(17) ϭ 2.80, p ϭ .012, or three incongruent trials, t(17) ϭ 1.37, p ϭ .190. The ANOVA conducted on the percentage of correct responses yielded only a significant effect of Congru- ency, F(1, 17) Figure 4a , participants in this experiment expected a congruent successor to arise after any number of incongruent trials, and vice versa. This manipulation thus appears to have been effective to produce an inversion of participants' "default" tendencies to expect a repetition after a single trial of each type. This inversion of the usual expectancies, together with the necessarily low number of cases involving longer repetition contexts, may have produced an increase in the variability of RT, which surely contributed to distort the progressive SCE obtained in this experiment. It is remarkable, however, that despite expecting a congruency alternation between successive trials, the effect of congruency still tended to be larger after a series of congruent trials than after a comparative series of incongruent trials.
Discussion of Experiments 2a and 2b: Comparison Between Experiments
The purpose of Experiments 2a and 2b was to manipulate participants' expectations regarding the congruency of the upcoming trial, by presenting different proportions of repetitions or alternations between types of trials, without changing the overall proportion of congruent trials. A comparison between these two experiments indicated that the manipulation of conditional probabilities had been effective to change participants' expectancies in the relevant contexts. A mixed-design ANOVA on the expectancy scores, with Experiment (2) as a between-participants factor, and with Context as a repeated measure, showed that the main effect of Experiment was not significant, F Ͻ 1, but that there was a significant effect of Context, F(5, 170) Figure 4a shows that these expectancies effectively responded to the experimental manipulations. In Experiment 2a, participants tended to expect repetitions of the same type of trial in all contexts, whereas in Experiment 2b they predicted alternations between congruent and incongruent trials.
At variance with this evidence, which showed that the manipulated contingencies had been effective in changing participants' expectancies concerning the congruency of the next trial, the effects of congruency remained relatively immune to such contingencies. A mixed-model ANOVA conducted on the congruency scores (i.e., on the differences in RTs between responses to incongruent and congruent trials), with Experiment as a betweenparticipants factor, and with Context as a repeated measure, showed a significant effect of Context, F(5, 170) ϭ 5.52, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .140, but not an interaction Experiment ϫ Context, F Ͻ 1. Figure 4b showed these differential scores computed separately for each context, and for each of the two experiments. As can be observed, the effect of congruency tended to increase after a series of two or three congruent trials, as compared with what occurred after similar series of incongruent trials. Interestingly, this was observed in both Experiments 2a and 2b, regardless of whether participants were explicitly predicting either repetitions or alternations in congruency. This result lends support to the conclusion that the modulation of congruency effects depends more on the amount of conflict observed over the previous trials than on the explicit expectancies declared by participants when they were asked to report them explicitly.
General Discussion
This series of experiments reported on two ways to dissociate repetition expectancies from conflict adaptation effects. In Experiment 1, we confronted two contrasting predictions arising from each of these two accounts of the SCE, concerning the development of these congruency effects over a growing series of trials of the same type. According to the conflict monitoring theory, if conflict is averaged over the last few trials to estimate the amount of control needed to deal with the upcoming trial, then one should predict that control would become minimal, and therefore that congruency effects should increase, after a series of consecutive congruent trials. Complementarily, the amount of control should be expected to increase after a series of incongruent trials, thus leading to a decrease in the effect of congruency obtained in these contexts. In contrast, if the SCEs are caused by repetition expectancies, then given that there is a tendency to expect an alternation after several trials of the same type, one could expect a similar inversion of the effects of congruency to arise after a series of repeated trials. Our results indicate that this is not the case, and that the observed effects of congruency are generally adjusted to the predictions derived from conflict-monitoring theory.
In Experiments 2a and 2b, we set up two probabilistic contingencies aimed at changing participants' expectancies on the congruency of the next trial, manipulating the conditional probabilities of presenting either a congruent or an incongruent trial depending on the congruency of the previous trial. The measures of expectancies confirmed that participants were sensitive to these conditional probabilities, but still the SCE were not substantially altered by these changes in expectancies, and continued showing a consistent decrease in the effects of congruency associated to increased amounts of conflict.
The results of this series of experiments indicate that, at least in these conditions, the SCEs cannot be attributed to repetition expectancies, and they can more readily be accounted for by relying on the assumptions of the conflict monitoring theory. Moreover, these results highlight the importance of considering long series of previous trials, rather than taking into account exclusively the congruency of the preceding trial. Finally, the results suggest that the congruency of a series of previous trials does modulate the effect of congruency even under conditions in which feature repetitions are avoided, and in which the RSI is consistently set to 0 ms (cf., Notebaert et al., 2006) . The fact that participants do not have time to prepare between successive trials does not remove the SCE, when this effect is analyzed progressively, in terms of the congruency of a series previous of trials. In the following paragraphs we will briefly comment on all these issues, and we will end by highlighting some of the methodological implications that these results may have for future studies.
Repetition Expectancies and Their Measures
Our results show a clear dissociation in a Stroop task between SCE and repetition expectancies when they are measured directly over independent blocks with a wagering technique. The fact that similar expectancy scores were collected over two independent blocks located, respectively, at the end of the procedure or between two regular blocks, indicates that these expectancies had not been generated at the end of the task, as an ad hoc reaction to this explicit questioning, but rather that they were available in the regular blocks. Therefore, it is remarkable that performance over the regular Stroop blocks was not affected by these explicit expectancies.
One might argue that such explicit expectancies measured with no temporal constraints over the wagering blocks were simply unusable in the regular blocks, because participants did not have time to develop such cognitive states and to rely on them. We agree with this argument, which converges, in its final form, toward the claim that the explicit expectancies built on the preceding trial play merely a minor role in such speeded performance. However, we should also point out that longer-range expectancies, generated over the series of previous trials, could have had enough time to develop and, at least in principle, might have affected the progressive SCE as we measure it in the present study. Perhaps some of these long-range expectancy effects could have been responsible for the increase in variability observed in Experiment 2b, in which noticing an alternating pattern may have induced a tendency opposite to that produced by the amount of accumulated conflict, after several trials of the same type. However, even in this experiment, the progressive SCEs show a tendency analogous to that found in Experiment 2a, in which the experimental conditions favored exactly the opposite repetition expectancies. In general, therefore, the pattern of results obtained over these two experiments does strongly indicate that the SCEs rely heavily on the amount of accumulated conflict, and that explicit expectancies play only a minor role in determining the size of these effects.
Taking a Larger Congruency Context Into Account
Our results also raise some important issues concerning the way in which the SCEs should be assessed, and on the way in which the previous context should be taken into account. Indeed, if one sticks to a standard definition of the SCE-that is, as a change in the congruency effect depending exclusively on the congruency of the preceding trial-then our Experiment 1 can be seen as a conceptual replication of some previous studies showing that this effect is removed when repetition priming is avoided (Puccioni & Vallesi, 2011) , and when the RSI is set to 0 ms (Notebaert et al., 2006) . However, in accordance with the predictions derived from the original conflict-monitoring model (Botvinick et al., 1999) , we confirmed that the effects of the previous congruency are extended beyond a single previous trial, and that they can be obtained with a RSI of 0 ms, and without feature repetitions, when the effect of longer contexts is taken into account. Thus, the conclusion that all SCEs obtained under conditions of RSI-0 should be attributed to repetition priming (Notebaert et al., 2006) could be in need of revision, because we have shown some sequential effects, which are due neither to repetition priming nor to explicit expectancies, but which affect participants' performance depending on the conflict accumulated over the preceding series of trials.
Adaptation to Conflict or to the Lack of Conflict?
The overall modulation of congruency effects observed in these experiments is thus mostly consistent with the predictions derived from the conflict-monitoring model. However, there are still two slightly different ways to interpret how the context made up of a series of previous trials can modulate the effect of congruency for the upcoming trial. The original label of "conflict adaptation," as proposed by Botvinick et al. (2001) , emphasizes the negative effects provoked by such conflict, and the gradual overcoming of these negative effects produced as the performer gets progressively adapted to that conflict. According to this interpretation, one might expect the largest modulatory effects to arise after a series of incongruent trials, showing a progressive decrease in the effects of congruency after having responded to a series of conflicting trials. In contrast, responding to a series of congruent trials should not produce large changes in performance, because the amount of conflict in this case remains relatively stable at low levels. If one looks at the actual distribution of congruency effects reported in the present experiments, however, it is remarkable that the pattern obtained is essentially opposite to that picture (see Figure 4b) . Thus, the congruency effects increased gradually with the length of the series of previous congruent trials, and fluctuated less clearly with the length of the series of incongruent trials. To further analyze this issue, we conducted two ANOVAS on the congruency scores, separately for congruent and incongruent contexts, with Experiment (3) as a between-participants variable, and with Run Length (3) as a repeated measure. These analyses confirmed that there was a significant effect of Run Length for the congruent contexts, F(2, 102) ϭ 9.94, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .15, showing a tendency for these congruency scores to grow linearly with the run length, F(1, 51) ϭ 14.15, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .22. In contrast, neither the main effect of Run Length, nor the corresponding linear trend was significant in the ANOVA conducted for the incongruent contexts. It appeared as if the process of "adaptation to conflict" was fulfilled after a single incongruent trial, so that this adaptation did not improve further after two or more trials of the same type. In contrast, contexts made by two or three consecutively congruent trials increased the effect of congruency beyond that found after a single congruent trial. In other words, participants seem to be relying progressively more on the irrelevant features of the stimuli as the number of consecutively congruent trials increases, but they don't seem to show an improvement toward avoiding the effect of such conflictive features with an increased number of consecutively incongruent trials.
Similar patterns of results have been recently obtained by Schlaghecken and Martini (2011) , who proposed a general context adaptation mechanism that responds both to the presence and to the absence of conflict, and by Lamers and Roelofs (2011) , who used neutral contexts to assess whether the observed difference in the effect of congruency was due either to a larger congruency effect obtained in the context of a preceding congruent trial, or to a reduced effect observed in the context of an incongruent trial. The results of this latter study showed that the congruency effect was larger for postcongruent trials than for postneutral trials, but that there was no difference between the neutral and the incongruent contexts (Lamers & Roelofs, 2011 , p. 1069 . In sum, all these recent results appear to indicate that, even though progressive adaptation to conflict could be important in certain circumstances, adaptation to the lack of conflict may also be contributing to the SCE, by increasing participants' reliance on whatever automatisms have proven to be useful in response over the last few trials, even if they are aware that past benefits did not predict future outcomes, or even if they have learned, as the participants in Experiment 2b did, that congruency in a trial is negatively correlated with congruency over the next trial.
Methodological Implications
Overall, this series of experiments has identified a context adaptation effect that is independent both from bottom-up repetition effects (Mayr, 2003; Hommel et al., 2004) , and from the top-down strategic adjustments which result from explicit expectancies. Importantly, our results confirm one of the original assumptions of the conflict-monitoring model (Botvinick et al., 1999) , sustaining that the relevant context should be considered as a weighted average computed over multiple preceding trials, rather than exclusively on the immediately preceding trial. Although Botvinick et al. (1999) did explicitly suggest that these higherorder sequential effects could account for effects such as that of proportion of congruency, it is remarkable that only a few recent studies have started to analyze how these higher-order contexts can affect performance in conflict tasks (see Clayson & Larson, 2011; Schlaghecken & Martini, 2011) .
As suggested above, varying the proportion of congruent trials has been shown to modulate the congruency effects, and this effect has been often attributed to changes in participants' strategies, resulting from an explicit or implicit encoding of this frequency information, and from the adaptation of the control processes to optimize performance in these conditions (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979) . However, given that presenting a large proportion of congruent trials does necessarily imply producing longer series of congruent trials, it is possible that this modulatory effect could be accounted for by relying exclusively on the effect of these highorder contexts, without assuming the acquisition of any information about the overall proportion of congruent trials. In general, the standard, first-order SCE has been inferred from a comparison between two differential scores denoted respectively as iC-cC and iI-cI. These two scores are tacitly assumed to be free from any further influence from previous contexts, but it is easy to see that, if most trials are congruent over a given condition, then cC trials will probably contain a disproportionally large number of trials in which the congruent trial has occurred after a long series of other congruent trials. This will improve RT in these particular trials, thus resulting in an overall increase of the SCE. In contrast, if most trials are incongruent in a given condition, then cC trials will probably contain many cases in which the cC series was preceded by an incongruent trial, which would tend to produce slower RTs, and therefore to decrease the standard measure of SCE. As a case in point, it is interesting to notice that, even though all our experiments used exactly the same proportion of congruency, favoring repetitions of the same type of trials produced an effect analogous to that expected by increasing the overall proportion of congruent trials. Indeed, the first-order SCE did only reach significance in Experiment 2a, arguably because in this case cC trials contained, by design, a large number of cases in which these two congruent trials had also been preceded by other congruent trials.
In sum, our results call attention to the importance of taking into account the effects of long-range contexts in producing SCEs, and point to the automatic nature of some control effects which depend on these long-range contexts. We have shown that these effects can become dissociated from explicit expectancies, and that they remain operative even in speeded conditions, with a RSI of 0 ms. Further research is required to confirm whether this sort of context adaptation effect, which we have characterized as an inertial adaptation to lack of conflict, could also be observed with larger RSIs.
